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Abstract 
Polar historians and enthusiasts are aware that toward the end of March 1912, Captain Robert F. Scott reported in his journal a 
meteorological event, which was extraordinary as far as its length and strength was concerned. This event was the gale which 
according to Captain Scott, lasted nine/ten days. Were the laws of physics suspended at the end of March 1912 in the Antarctic? I 
have shown that the near surface winds in the Antarctic are self-organized critically and that the winds over the continent form an 
ergodic system. I have presented an analysis of wind events in the proximity of Captain Scott’s camp and at Ross Island. By com-
paring wind events at these locations, and performing an analysis of a gale’s wind duration and strength at One Ton Depôt, I con-
cluded that Captain Scott’s wind record was highly inaccurate. I concluded that the nine/ten day gale described by Captain Scott, 
that lasted from March 21 to 29, did not take place. This result combined with my previous analysis of Captain Scott’s tempera-
ture record, shows that two black swan meteorological events: February 27-March 19, 1912 – Extreme Cold Snap and March 21-
29, 1912 – Never Ending Gale reported by Captain Scott, did not take place. Therefore, I conclude that the deaths of Scott, Wilson 
and Bowers were a matter of choice rather than chance.                 
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1. Introduction  
 
During the planning and executing stages, the Captain Scott 
and Roald Amundsen expeditions were definite events 
which were reduced into numbers: miles per day, calories 
per day, temperature, efficiency, work, forecast, friction, etc. 
Both the explorers and the members of their expeditions, in 
different degrees of proficiency and expertise, transformed 
these numbers into their everyday lifestyles and actions. 
Roald Amundsen and Captain Scott had accumulated 
knowledge and experience in Polar Regions while planning 
the South Pole expedition. Amundsen gained his skills dur-
ing the Belgica Expedition (1897–99)1 and Northwest Pas-
sage (1903–1906).2  Captain Scott acquired his familiarity 
with the Antarctic throughout his Discovery Expedition 
(1901-1904).3 
 One of the most perplexing questions concerns what 
actually took place during the final days of the struggle of 
Captain Scott and his companions to the Cape Evans home 
base en route from the South Pole. 
 Life in Antarctica is inevitably related and dictated by 
the modes, severity, and apparent unpredictability of the 
weather. Then and now, a small weather window of oppor-
tunity appears for humans to explore the vast Antarctic con-
tinent. The size of this opportunity is simply measured by air 
temperature, human endurance and mileage to be crossed. If 
the distance travelled was to be extended, it would mean that 
endurance and organization would have to be better, mean-
ing, better performance on a personal and organizational 
level would be needed. The game to reach the South Pole 
was a performance game. We know the results: Amundsen 
first, Scott second. We know or at least assume to know that 
Roald Amundsen’s trip to the South Pole was a flawless 
effort, whereas Captain Scott suffered on many occasions.  
 However, as far as the Roald Amundsen and Captain 
Scott expeditions and reaching the South Pole is concerned, 
it is useful to make a ceteris paribus assumption. The as-
sumption is that, in spite of different methods, means, and 
human effort, both expeditions were able to reach the South 
Pole and both teams were capable of returning safely to the 
base camp at Framheim and Cape Evans (Hut Point), respec-
tively. This leaves the weather, understood as a combination 
of temperature and wind velocity, as the only independent 
variable.  
 I just mention two related examples. The first is Roald 
Amundsen’s premature attempt to reach the South Pole on 8 
September 1911, which had to be abandoned due to ex-
tremely low temperatures. The extremities of these tempera-
tures are not due to any absolute temperature values, but 
because the dogs could not withstand the impact.4 The sec-
ond example is the four day blizzard, which struck Captain 
Scott’s South Pole party at the foot of the Beardmore Gla-
cier on December 5, 1911.  
 After examining the weather record of both the Roald 
Amundsen South Pole party and the Scott South Pole party, 
a list can be presented of temperature and wind velocity 
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records measured every day of their trip. Just by looking at 
the respective plots of temperature and/or wind velocity 
versus time, rather regular (expected) variations of these 
variables can certainly be observed. Even the just mentioned 
four-day-blizzard would fall into this ordinary category. 
Only two meteorological events described by Captain Scott 
would fall into the category of extremely rare weather 
events, as observed (rouge wave) by Ernest Shackleton just 
before landing on the south shore of the South Georgia Is-
land.5  These weather events are sometimes called in power-
laws jargon6: a black swan, outliers, dragon-kings or rogue 
wave (solitary wave). 
 Two black swan events were described by Captain Scott, 
and one event followed the other. The first black swan event 
occurred on a February 27-March 19, 1912 – Extreme Cold 
Snap, and the second occurred on a March 21-29, 1912 – 
Never Ending Gale.   
 Captain Scott and Roald Amundsen expeditions may be 
digitalized and analyzed, as in modern terms, we are accus-
tom to think the entire Universe is a digital machine.7. Such 
an observation may be quite palpable for anyone who has 
ever planned a vacation trip or even a more challenging self-
sustained expedition. Indeed, the Antarctic Manual8 issued 
by the Royal Geographical Society (RGS) was intended as a 
digital description of various aspects of the planned Captain 
Scott Discovery Expedition. Unfortunately, instead of pro-
moting “correct digits” the Antarctic Manual was a fairly 
random collection of different papers on various subjects 
related to the expedition. The RGS Secretary, Sir Markham 
was straightforward about his input9 
   
 “I planned an Antarctic Manual on the lines of the Arc-
tic Manuals prepared for the expedition of 1875-76, se-
curing the services of Mr. G. Murray as editor. It proved 
very useful, the first part containing instructions and in-
formation by leading men of science, and the second part 
being the narratives of Biscoe, Balleny, Dumont d'Ur-
ville, and Wilkes, with papers on polar travelling by Sir 
Leopold M'Clintock and on the exploration of Antarctic 
lands by Arctowski.” 
 
  More importantly, the Manual was used by Sir Cements 
Markham to promote his interests by selecting certain con-
tributors, rather than a sound scientific and digital handbook. 
In particular, an article by Sir Leopold McClintock, re-
printed in the manual, presented incorrect values of sledging 
dog food rations. The rations advised by McClintock were 
half of what they should be. This error of negligence by 
McClintock, Markham, Murray, Scott and Shackleton 
pushed the whole history of British Antarctic exploration 
into the Heroic Age of Antarctic Exploration instead of into 
the Grand Age of Antarctic Exploration. See Appendix for 
more details.   
  It seems that Roald Amundsen and his team were suffi-
ciently skilled at keeping and following the right numbers. 
Amundsen, unlike Captain Scott, was able to capture the 
right digits and the relationships between them. He followed 
what I call, ‘fine tuned polar exploration’ which includes 
subtle digital values and their relationships between nature 
(physical and life) and human needs and actions.10 
  Although the Amundsen and Captain Scott expeditions 
were preliminary logistic undertakings, this fundamental 
aspect of these expeditions was neglected by historians and 
bio- and hagiographers. Only a few exceptions exist scat-
tered in professional journals. The majority of books con-
centrated on nostalgic lamenting over the suffering of Cap-
tain Scott and his companions. Authors close their eyes to 
scientific analysis while arguing that Captain Scott’s expedi-
tion was a preliminary scientific expedition. The problem 
goes as far as data dragging, and/or attributing exaggerated 
data (increasing daily temperatures, wind velocities and its 
duration) to the Captain Scott expedition. In the case of 
Susan Solomon’s work,  data were even falsified in an at-
tempt to prove her point.11 However, falsifications or so-
called ‘minor adjustments’, are not such a risky undertaking, 
as can be seen in Leonard Huxley’s work. He got away with 
his falsification of Captain Scott’s temperature records al-
most one hundred years ago.12    
  Polar historians and enthusiasts are aware that toward the 
end of March 1912, Captain Scott, this time without the 
support of Lt. Bowers or Dr. Wilson, reported in his journal 
a meteorological event which was extraordinary as far as its 
length and strength was concerned. This event was the gale 
which lasted nine/ten days. Captain Scott’s entry tells us, 
“Thursday, March 29. – Since the 21st we have had a con-
tinuous gale from W.S.W. and S.W.” and continues “Every 
day we have been ready to start for our depot 11 miles away, 
but outside the door of the tent it remains a scene of whirling 
drift.”13 
  A careful reader can note from Captain Scott’s own 
descriptions or from Simpson’s meteorological record and 
analysis, that frequently observed gales (or blizzards) at the 
Ross Ice Shelf last about one-two days. One or two days are 
to be expected, but nine or ten days?  
  Were the laws of physics suspended at the end of March 
1912 in the Antarctic? Did it happen for a second time? Did 
it happen only at the actual location of Captain Scott’s team 
and did it not occur at locations where simultaneous meas-
urements were taken by other members of the Terra Nova 
Expedition? 
 
  
2. Nature of Near Surface Winds in the 
Antarctic 
 
I have already shown in my previous work14 that the first 
black swan15 in the meteorological record (February 27-
March 19, 1912 – Extreme Cold Snap) of Captain Scott did 
not happen, and the laws of physics were not suspended on 
the Ross Ice Shelf.  
  Captain Scott posed some questions which also concern 
the laws of physics. At the entrance to the Beardmore Gla-
cier, Captain Scott’s South Pole party was stopped and held 
in their tents for four long days by a blizzard or gale as he 
called it in the Message to the Public. Captain Scott posited 
the question, “What on earth does such weather mean at this 
time of year?” and wonders: “Is there some widespread 
atmospheric disturbance which will be felt everywhere in 
this region as a bad season, or are we merely the victims of 
exceptional local conditions? If the latter, there is food for 
thought in picturing our small party struggling against ad-
versity in one place whilst others go smilingly forward in the 
sunshine.”16   
  Captain Scott’s reasoning is interesting indeed. It may 
sound as a beacon to his lines in his famed Message to the 
Public “our wreck is certainly due to this sudden advent of 
severe weather which does not seem to have any satisfactory 
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cause.”17 But in the above comments by Capitan Scott two 
variables: distance and time, are missing. The distance be-
tween the entrance to the Beardmore Glacier and McMurdo 
Sound is about 600 km. It is more than the distance between 
London and Edinburgh. Does anyone expect or anticipate 
analogous weather conditions between these two cities? 
Cutting that distance in half one finds himself in about the 
position of (Leeds/Manchester) the One Ton Depôt or 
Schwerdtfeger (-79.904°, 169.97°) automated weather sta-
tion, and Captain Scott’s last camp. This was the very place 
where the second black swan meteorological event struck at 
gale strength and held the party in their tent for nine/ten 
days. Is it really possible that such a gigantic (duration and 
strength) wind event can actually take place? Is it possible 
that such a gigantic wind event can take place as geographi-
cally isolated phenomenon?  
  The question of nature and the wind dynamics over the 
Antarctic continent has been a central issue since the early 
developments of global earth atmospheric air circulation.18 
Four Americans, Charles Tracy (1843), William Ferrel 
(1856/1859), Matthew F. Maury (1859) James H. Coffin 
(1875), at around the same time, independently arrived at a 
similar description of global air circulation.19 However, it 
may be of an even greater surprised to learn that American 
explorer Charles Wilkes, who sailed into the Antarctic 
Ocean, also published a book in which he correctly accounts 
for global circulation. In his book, “Theory of the Wind” 
published in 1856, Captain Wilkes explains20: 
 
It is known that the earth revolves on its axis, in a direc-
tion from west to east, increasing from the Poles to the 
Equator, where it attains a velocity of 1000 miles per 
hour, - so that the air, in passing from the highest lati-
tudes towards the Equator, progressively arrives at re-
gions of increased rotary velocity; and, as they cannot 
keep pace with this increase of motion, they necessarily 
hang back, and form currents flowing in a direction op-
posite to that of the rotation of the earth, or from east to 
west, and thus, by these combined efforts, the northern 
and southern currents of air are deflected and modified, 
so as to become the permanent north-easterly and south-
easterly currents, forming the magnificent phenomenon 
of the Trade Winds. 
The theory is summed up, that whenever the air has 
greater velocity of rotation than the surface of the earth, 
a wind more or less westerly is produced, and when it 
has less velocity, a wind having an easterly tendency re-
sults. 
 
 When investigations were first made, many authors as-
sumed that katabatic winds are downslope gradient-driven 
flows.21 The long-wave radiative loss to space, leads to the 
build-up of high density cold air over the Antarctic dome. 
The presence of dome slope (relative height) induces a hori-
zontal temperature gradient, leading to a downslope horizon-
tal pressure-gradient katabatic force. Katabatic winds are 
then driven toward the coastal fringes and outwards towards 
the Antarctic Ocean. This scenario may be pertinent during 
the winter time. However, during the equinoctial seasons, 
katabatic winds are also observed. Such an observance takes 
place despite the simple fact that radiative loss, mentioned 
above, does not takes place. On the contrary, the Antarctic 
dome surface gains energy. While using loosely defined 
parameters, various rationalizations have been developed.  
 
Figure 1. An example of a near surface wind event (wind 
velocity ) measured at the Antarctica New Zealand Scott 
Base. 
 
 
These rationalizations account for the expected different 
dynamical behaviour at meso- to synoptic-scale regimes of 
driving forces of near surface wind in the Antarctic.22 
 However, even a cursory examination will show that the 
vortex over the Antarctic continent is slowly-driven by a 
solar radiation non-equilibrium system with many degrees 
of freedom and a high level of nonlinearity. Figure 1 depicts 
a near surface wind velocity  measured at the Antarctica 
New Zealand Scott Base station located at the southern tip 
of Hut Point Peninsula of Ross Island. The erratic behaviour 
of this time series is clearly visible.  
 In equilibrium statistical mechanics, the inverse of tem-
perature  	
  is a constant physical system parameter for 
a given state with energy  However; all natural phenomena 
exhibit significant spatiotemporal temperature fluctuations 
(mesoscale). For this reason, such phenomena must be re-
garded as non-equilibrium systems.23  
 In order to illustrate this behaviour, I analyzed the event-
like structure of wind events which are partially depicted on 
Fig. 1. Their shown time scale can be divided into two com-
partmental events directly related to the size and the dura-
tion of the events. The first case of non-zero measurements 
of the wind velocity I will call the wind event size . I 
define the wind event as     for succes-
sive non-zero wind velocities, where  is the size of the 
measurement bin. In the second case, the second compart-
ment can be considered duration of wind event  and 
duration of quiescent wind event , respectively. 
 To analyze wind behaviour, I will use its size distribu-
tion and occurrence frequency distribution. When estimating 
a cumulative size distribution , wind duration distribu-
tion , and wind quiescent distribution  for a 
given data set, the number of wind events of the size 
    or greater is counted. The following power-law 
cumulative size distributions is used to fit measured wind 
velocity 
 
  
 !    
 "#$  
 % 
 
 By analysing wind velocity data from about 40 meteoro-
logical stations scattered across the Antarctic continent, I 
have found that data follow the above equations.(See Table 
1) Thus, the wind events at these sites are self-organized 
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criticality.24 This is an important and fundamental property 
of the winds in the Antarctic.  
 The observed self-organized criticality of katabatic 
winds suggests that atmosphere over the Antarctic continent 
is organized into many interacting katabatic air cells forming 
the Polar Cell – circumpolar near surface wind regime. The 
motion of these katabatic cells is driven by local rather than 
continental forces, predominantly by a downslope buoyancy 
forcing. Each air cell contributes to the katabatic air cell at a 
certain threshold. Hence, the air over the Antarctic Plateau 
piles up on ice sheet-formed gullies and valleys while relax-
ing its excess along contoured orography of coastal fringes 
or glacier slopes. At a given time, near surface air over the 
Antarctic continent contains a great number of volatile air 
cells dissociated by close to equilibrium relaxed air cells, or 
the opposite.  
 Volatile and relaxed air cells are transient. These cells 
are formed much faster than the slow time-scale of driving 
force resulting from incoming solar radiation and the long-
wave radiative loss to space. This process means the air 
system evolves through a sequence of states that are infini-
tesimally close to equilibrium in a cycle: driving, katabatic 
event, and relaxation. Transition between volatile air cells 
occurs through katabatic wind events which restore and 
redistribute driving field forces. The katabatic wind events, 
duration, and quiescent wind event have no preferred scale, 
and their sizes and durations follow power-law distributions. 
The numerical values of the exponents depend on the geo-
graphical location measured by the slope of the Antarctic 
dome. The wind field over the Antarctic is likely to be of a 
critical state. These are the essential factors of the mean field 
behaviour of near surface katabatic winds in the Antarctic or 
over arbitrary ice dome on Earth or on other planets.  
 
 
Table 1. Selected locations with respective scaling parame-
ters. 
  
Location /Scaling & & & 
The Antarctic 
Continent (AC) 
' (  )* ( ) ++' ( , 
McMurdo (McM) - ( . ++. ( / ).. ( ' 
Scott Base (SB) - (  -* ( - +'/ ( ' 
Schwerdtfeger (SCH) +. (  -* ( - +)' ( ) 
 
 
 
 Recently Magdziarz and Weron25 derived a version of 
the Khinchin theorem for Lévy flights. Their result gives us 
a tool to study ergodic properties of Lévy 0 1 234567 distri-
butions including the above reported power-law distribu-
tions of wind events in the Antarctic. The result of combined 
cumulative distribution functions of all wind events for the 
entire Antarctic Continent is given in Table 1. This confirms 
that wind over the Antarctic reaches a state of self-organized 
criticality and also that wind circulation shows ergodic be-
haviour. Therefore, a fractional Fokker-Planck equation for 
the probability distribution of air particles whose motion is 
governed by a non-Gaussian Lévy-stable noise, would be a 
suitable theoretical approach in the description of near sur-
face winds over the Antarctic continent.     
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative wind size distribution function at 
Schwerdtfeger weather station located near One Ton Depôt 
and the final camp of Captain Scott’s party. 
 
 
 
3. Results and Discussion  
 
In my analysis, I used 26 years of wind data measured at 
Schwerdtfeger and at the Antarctica New Zealand Scott 
Base26 station located at the southern tip of Hut Point Penin-
sula of Ross Island, Antarctica. New Zealand’s Scott Base is 
directly “facing” all meteorological events at the Ross Ice 
Shelf.  
 Both, Scott Base and Schwerdtfeger stations are not 
exceptions to the self-organized criticality of wind events 
shown in the above preceding sections. In Figure 2, I have 
depicted the cumulative size distribution function  for 
“raw” data for Schwerdtfeger. Wind event size distribution 
at this station shows typical power-law behaviour with scal-
ing parameter α8  +. ( . Similar wind size scaling 
parameters calculated for Scott Base and McMurdo stations 
are α8  - (  and α8  - ( ., respectively. See 
Table 1.   
  Up to now, the belief that arbitrary size wind event may 
happen in the Antarctic was taken for granted by polar en-
thusiasts and authors. Although the nine/ten day gale at the 
end of March 1912, described by Captain Scott, was indeed 
an extraordinary event, no one bothered to look at meteoro-
logical data.    
  I have shown above, that due to the evident scaling prop-
erty of wind event size at Schwerdtfeger and the remaining 
stations/locations, it can be argued that at this particular 
location, which is very close to the last camp of Capitan 
Scott’s party, arbitrary wind event size is certainly possible. 
Thus, one can attempt to make a scholarly inference based 
on the above analysis of the scaling properties of wind 
events, suggesting the nine/ten days gale reported by Cap-
tain Scott did indeed take place.  
  However, such a conjuncture is not correct. The occur-
rence of arbitrary wind event size is only a theoretical possi-
bility that a power-law relationship   9:; holds at 
Schwerdtfeger station, without physical limits or underlying 
physics laws. 
  On a grander scale than the Schwerdtfeger location, I 
have shown above that wind reaches a state of self-
organized criticality over the whole Antarctic continent. The 
movement of the wind takes place within the polar cell 
boundary and the transported pool (mass) of air is limited  
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Figure 3. The longest and strongest wind event occurred at 
Schwerdtfeger station (One Ton Depôt) between Nov. 1 and 
Nov. 13, 2004. 
 
 
and must be conserved. Therefore, no arbitrary wind event 
size can be observed. 
  Another important and limiting factor is the time needed 
to pass, in order for the observer to note arbitrary small or 
big event. And the third factor is that wind events at the 
Ross Ice Shelf are correlated. This means that whatever size 
wind event occurs at, for example, the Schwerdtfeger loca-
tion, a similar in size (though delayed in time) event occurs 
at the Scott Base and McMurdo station. Alike correlations 
were also found between near surface air temperatures at 
these locations. 
  Capitan Scott reported that on March 21-29, 1912,  a 
blizzard of gale force confined the party in the tent. It is fair 
to assume that Captain Scott, as a Royal Navy officer, was 
well trained and acquainted in describing wind force accord-
ing to the Beaufort scale.27 In this empirical measure, wind 
velocity in the range of 17.2–20.7 m/s (62–74 km/h) is 
named a gale – Beaufort number 8. Captain Scott used the 
term gale or moderate gale 59 times in his journal. When-
ever, it was possible I checked Captain Scott’s  description 
against the Terra Nova or Simpson record and I confirmed 
that Captain Scott’s description was accurate, with only one 
exception: the gale of March 21-29, 1912.  
 The Beaufort scale was a standard for ship log entries on 
Royal Navy vessels in the late 1830s. The Beaufort scale is 
rather a phenomenological scale.28 The biggest pitfall of this 
scale is the lack of a time frame at which a given wind ve-
locity has to be sustained in order to fall into a given cate-
gory. Wind gusts and continuous fluctuations additionally 
complicate the issue.  
 Nevertheless, I have assumed that if within a 24h time 
frame, at least a onetime recorded wind velocity was equal 
or higher than the lower bound gale velocity (17.2 m/s 
62km/h), and then a 24h frame was called “gale-day”. If 
two gale-days were recorded in two, three, … consecutive 
days then such wind event is called a two day gale, three day 
gale, etc. This assumption is truly a very moderate one as a 
single wind gust would make a gale-day.     
 The general behaviour and structure of wind events have 
already been presented in Fig.1 for New Zealand’s Scott 
Base. In spite of the erratic behaviour of wind events, a 
careful examination led me to conclude that self-organized 
criticality of wind events is observed across the Antarctic 
continent. Due to the above mentioned scaling properties of 
wind events, some assumptions can be made about the long-
est possible wind event at the location of Captain Scott’s last 
camp in the proximity of One Ton Depôt. The assumptions 
would then apply to events close to the modern Schwerdtfe-
ger weather station. By taking into account the whole avail-
able record of wind data (1986-2011), I found that the long-
est and strongest wind event occurred between Nov. 1 and 
Nov. 13, 2004. The wind velocity structure of this event is 
depicted on Figure 3. The duration of a wind event is under-
stood as a continuous record of wind velocity  <  m/s with 
a detection threshold of about 0.1 m/s.  
 The Nov. 1 - Nov. 13, 2004 wind event which lasted 
thirteen consecutive days, had a few important characteris-
tics. First of all, there was an extremely fast wind escalation 
(rise).29 For an observer from the ground, it appeared as a 
wind blast. The second important characteristic was the 
wave structure of the wind velocity changes. And the third 
was the sudden downfall of wind.  
 To illustrate Captain Scott’s wind record, I have also 
shown the lower bound of the Beaufort scale for wind of 
gale, near gale, and fresh breeze strength on the same figure 
(Fig. 3). The implications from this comparison is rather 
palpable. Captain Scott claimed that at their final camp - 
about 11 miles from One Ton Depôt, his party encountered a 
nine/ten day long gale. It is self-evident from Fig. 3, that it is 
stretching the meaning to call this most severe recorded 
wind event, a gale. There are only two wind gusts (spikes) 
on Fig. 3 which hardly and briefly reach gale force. Lower-
ing the Beaufort scale to near gale force on the same figure 
shows that the biggest wind event can hardly be called a 
near gale event.  
       The following definitions30 may be useful to re-call how 
the Beaufort scale is related to land conditions:  
Fresh Breeze  -Branches of a moderate size move. Small 
   trees in leaf begin to sway, 
Near Gale  -Whole trees in motion. Effort needed to 
   walk against the wind, 
Gale    - Some twigs broken from trees. Progress 
   on foot is seriously impeded.  
 In the Antarctic, the wind creates near surface drag force. 
This force drives along air diamond dust and sweeps into the 
air those snow grains which were deposited on the surface. 
Conditions called a blizzard are then created. Blizzard con-
ditions are those in which visibility and contrast are severely 
reduced.  
 According to Captain Scott’s last entry in his field jour-
nal on March 29, 1912, the combined conditions of a 
nine/ten day gale with blizzard conditions was to blame for 
their failure to reach the One Ton Depôt. In particular, Cap-
tain Scott’s comments “Every day we have been ready to 
start for our depôt 11 miles away, but outside the door of the 
tent it remains a scene of whirling drift.”31      
 The biggest wind event presented in Fig. 3 was rather a 
fresh breeze. Such a breeze is much below that of a gale. 
Thus, the biggest wind event recorded by a modern weather 
station, at the proximity of One Ton Depôt, was about two 
times smaller than the event reported by Captain Scott back 
in March, 1912, and it took place in November not in March. 
 In modern data, it is not difficult to find the biggest wind 
event at Schwerdtfeger weather station, in the month of 
March. Such an event was observed between March 24-31, 
1994 and is depicted on Fig. 4. The presented wind observa-
tion in March 1994, further confirms that the nine/ten day 
gale described by Captain Scott was much greater in length  
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Figure 4. The biggest wind event at Schwerdtfeger weather 
station (One Ton Depôt), in the month of March. The event 
was recorded between March 24-31, 1994. 
 
 
and force than any wind observed on modern record. This 
particular wind event March 24-31, 1994 also reveals an 
already described feature of all wind events in the Antarctic. 
This characteristic is a sudden rise and downfall of wind 
separated by frequent wind humps. These wind humps are 
long time scale fluctuations of wind velocity. The definition 
of blizzard provided by the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration32 requires sustained gusts of gale 
force or greater, and blowing (falling) snow which reduces 
visibility to less than ¼ mile. 
 Returning to Fig. 3 and 4, it can be noted that within 
these extreme wind events one can select two different time 
windows: above the fresh breeze line and below the fresh 
breeze line. According to this definition, the conditions and 
the time “spend” by wind events below the fresh breeze line 
cannot be regarded as blizzard conditions. More impor-
tantly, when the weather conditions below the fresh breeze 
line are favourable, travel is thought possible although chal-
lenging. Looking at Fig. 4 it may be concluded that although 
this longest and strongest wind event lasted about 4 days 
(96h), there were encouraging weather conditions about half 
of the time. Thus, an average distance of about 22 miles 
could have been crossed by Captain Scott’s sledging party. 
Obviously, the day & night routine would have to have been 
changed to a “pitch a tent and go when you can” schedule. 
Exactly the same observation can also be made by analyzing 
the biggest recorded November wind event at Schwerdtfeger 
station (One Ton Depôt). Therefore, the immobility of Cap-
tain Scott’s party due to the nine/ten day gale from March 
21-29, 1912 is dubious.  
 Let me investigate the next question of how many days a 
gale may last at the Ross Ice Shelf. A definition of gale-days 
was given above and a similar assumption is made in rela-
tion to weaker, near gale (13.9 m/s 50 km/h) wind events.  
  Figure 5 depicts the total number of consecutive gale-
days recorded at the Schwerdtfeger and Scott Base weather 
stations, for every month of March from the whole 1985-
2011 period. A wealth of knowledge is depicted in this fig-
ure. From my point of view and in relation to Captain 
Scott’s record, it can be seen that in all the analyzed months 
of March (Figure 5, C & D), the longest consecutive gale 
and near gale winds lasted for three (3) and four (4) days. 
That is far below the black swan nine/ten day gale reported 
by Captain Scott. Figure 5 provides the second argument  
Table 2. The weather Register of the Second Relief Party – 
Atkinson and Keohane.33 
 
 
Date         Time 
Dry Bulb 
Tem-
perature 
=>? 
 
Wind 
Force 
Minimum  
Tempera-
ture =>? 
March 27 14:30 +2.5 3 - 
                 17:30 -3.5 3 - 
March 28   7:00 -6.5 2 -6.0 
                 12:30 -15.5 3 - 
                 17:00 -6.5 1 - 
March 29   7:00 -3.5 1-2 -13.0 
                 12:30 -0.5 - - 
                 17:30 -0.5 1-2 - 
March  30  7:00 -8.5 1-2 -16.0 
                 12:00 -3.5 3-4 - 
                 17:30 -5.5 3-4 - 
March  31  7:00 -13.5 3-4 -13.0 
 
 
against Captain Scott’s record of a nine/ten day long gale in 
late March 1912. The gigantic gale winds (and thus, the 
blizzard) reported by Captain Scott are of unfounded propor-
tions and the laws of physics were not suspended in 1912.  
 I presented the above two powerful arguments against 
Captain Scott’s claim of an endless gale at the end of March 
1912. Actually, the gale was not Captain Scott’s first claim 
of unexpected weather. It is the second unfounded reason 
used by Captain Scott to explain “the storm which has fallen 
on us within 11 miles of the depôt at which we hoped to 
secure our final supplies.”34 But the truth was, the One Ton 
Depôt was not exactly salvation. The Depôt had not been 
stored, because the written orders of Captain Scott had not 
been followed. A salient mutiny was already taking place at 
Cape Evans in early 1912. Everyone had their own excuses 
for leaving the place. The dog driver, Cecil Meares, left on 
his own terms, G. Simpson the meteorologist, was appar-
ently re-called for more (?) important duties in India, and 
Atkinson unwillingly assumed the command post without 
authority nor the means to enforce it. But it was Dr. Atkin-
son, who through his meteorological record of the rescue 
attempt in late March 1912, provides the final argument that 
Captain Scott forged his meteorological record. Not long 
after Cherry-Garrard and Demetri’s premature dispatch of a 
relief attempt35, a decision was taken to dispatch the Second 
Relief Party on March 26, 1912. Atkinson and Keohane 
started out alone from Hut Point to search for and help 
Scott's party. Neither of them could handle dog sledging and 
they resorted to the standard man-hauling technique. Their 
progress was very slow, only nine miles per day. The party 
travelled only to a point eight miles south of Corner Camp 
where Atkinson recorded: “At this date [March 30, KS] in 
my own mind, I was morally certain that the party had per-
ished"36. Atkinson conjuncture is surprising, both because of 
its appeal to moral issues and its post factum character. An 
elementary calculation of the possible arrival time of Cap-
tain Scott’s party, with a number of updates resulting from 
information provided by returning parties would give to 
Atkinson a date, March 30 (Corner Camp, @40 miles (@64 
km) from Hut Point)37, which clearly questions his moral 
confidence.  
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Figure 5. The total number of consecutive gale-days recorded at Schwerdtfeger (One Ton Depôt) and Scott Base weather stations, 
for whole record and for every month of March from the 1985-2011 period. 
 
 
After leaving Hut Point, Atkinson and Keohane’s party was 
fully exposed to air stream flowing northward along the 
Transantarctic Mountains.38 Due to the already shown high 
correlations of temperatures and wind velocities along Cap-
tain Scott’s route, including Atkinson and Keohane’s course, 
both parties should have experienced the same or very simi-
lar weather conditions.      
 In the small Table 2, I have presented the weather Regis-
ter of the Second Relief Party (Atkinson and Keohane). It is 
self-evident from this table, that the weather conditions 
recorded by Atkinson were mild. On March 26, Atkinson 
observed “The temperature was exceedingly low but the 
weather fair.”39 From March 27 until March 30, he recorded 
a wind force between 1 to 3. Thus, the strongest wind ob-
served by the relief party was a gentle breeze; leaves and 
small twigs constantly moving according to the Beaufort 
scale description.   
 Comparing these conditions and the analysis of wind 
duration and strength as a raging gale at One Ton Depôt, the 
conclusion is that Captain Scott’s wind record was highly 
inaccurate. The second black swan meteorological event did 
not take place.    
 There are two side issues which one may argue against 
my confirmation that Captain Scott invented the nine/ten 
day gale. These issues include the possibility that during his 
final days, Capitan Scott lost his ability for a reasonable, 
healthy judgement of reality due to his physical and mental 
state. There is no question that Captain Scott suffered 
greatly. There is no question that he was not sure about the 
actual date. Wilson, Bowers and possibly Captain Scott were 
uncertain whether the date was 21 or 22 March. However, 
even if we assume this ‘one day of uncertainty’ as a fact, it 
is obvious according to my analysis, that a gale that was one 
day shorter also never occurred.  
 Captain Scott wrote a number of farewell letters, a Mes-
sage to the Public and a couple entries in his Journal during 
the last days of March 1912. All of these writings, their 
style, and finally the fact that they were written in his usual 
handwriting, confirm, at least up to this heartbreaking mo-
ment, that in spite of his words “It seems a pity, but I do not 
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think I can write more”, Captain Scott was able to reasona-
bly and rationally judge reality.         
 
 
                
4. Conclusions  
 
In my research on Captain Scott’s meteorological data re-
ported by him and his party, I analysed two black swan 
events; February 27-March 19, 1912 – Extreme Cold Snap 
and March 21-29, 1912 – Never Ending Gale. In the analysis 
of the first black swan event I used a powerful computer-
supported method of neural network simulation. This par-
ticular method enabled me to first of all, test the simula-
tion’s performance by using modern precise temperature 
data collected at locations associated with Captain Scott’s 
expedition. Secondly, after multiple and satisfactory tests, 
the designed artificial neural network allowed me to use 
historic temperature data collected by Simpson, to recon-
struct the true temperature record at the locations of Captain 
Scott’s party in February and March 1912. Thus, I have 
shown that the temperature record of Captain Scott’s party 
between Feb. 27-Mar. 19, 1912 was altered by Lt. Bowers 
and Captain Scott to inflate and dramatize the weather con-
ditions. 
  In the present paper, I have used different methods to 
analyze what Captain Scott reported as a wind event of 
unprecedented proportions. The analysis of this second 
black swan meteorological event confirmed that despite my 
discovery of self-organized criticality of wind events in the 
Antarctic, a wind event (length and strength) described by 
Captain Scott did not take place.  
  Indeed these two black swan meteorological events fol-
lowed each other. One could say, that in reality Captain 
Scott was struck by one dragon king40 meteorological event 
starting on February 27 and continuing until March 29, 
1912. Captain Scott’s reported February 27-March 19, 1912 
– Extreme Cold Snap and March 21-29, 1912 – Never End-
ing Gale were invented meteorological events and never 
occurred.  
  Therefore, I conclude that the deaths of Scott, Wilson 
and Bowers were a matter of choice rather than chance. It 
was a choice made long before the actual end of food, fuel 
and physical strength needed to reach the unsupplied by 
Meares, Simpson and Atkinson, salvation at One Ton Depôt.    
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Appendix: A Comment on Dog Use 
and Dog Rations.  
 
'I Therefore Take the Liberty 
to Propose Three Cheers for 
the Dogs' 
(October 24, 2008) 
 
Lord Curzon's famous quotation cited in Bomann-Larsen41 
seems a fitting start for comments on Carl Murray's recent 
article in Polar Record entitled The use and abuse of dogs on 
Scott's and Amundsen's South Pole expeditions in which he 
presents a reassessment of the topic.42 Murray devises a false 
presupposition that underlines all the puzzles it involves. Se-
lecting from the original narratives only quotations that support 
his thesis, Murray claims that Scott applied utilitarianism to his 
expedition dogs in contrast to Amundsen who took a utilitarian 
approach by killing dogs and puppies. However, Murray disre-
gards the same utilitarian killing (with Scott's euphemism 're-
duce' or 'remove') of puppies during the Discovery and Terra 
Nova expeditions.43 He also ignores what is self evident from 
Scott's Discovery diaries 'that the animals [dogs, KS] were 
carried on the sledges to keep them alive as fodder'.44 
 In a Table 1A, I have summarised maximum load and dis-
tance for sustainable polar sledging. The data were taken from  
Table 1A: Estimated pooling power and distance of man and 
dog.         
McClintock Ref. 46 data for pooling power and distance. 
The relationship between food weight for man 
and dog is unclear. 
1 man 1 load  1 distance* /day 
1 dog ½ load  ~ 2 distance/day 
McClintock45 & 1901(Ref.47) data for pooling power and 
distance.  
Food weight for 2 dogs=1 man’s food 
1 man 1 load 1 distance/day 
2 dogs 1 load 1¼ distance/day 
2 dogs 1 light load 2 distance/day 
Murray Ref. 42 data for pooling power and distance. 
Food weight for 1 dog=1 man’s food. 
1 man 1 load 1 distance/day 
1 dog 1 load  1¼ distance/day 
1 dog 1 light load  1½ distance/day 
*McClintock’s original estimation for distance was 13 miles 
and can be found only in the third edition of his narrative 
Ref. 46. 
 
the third edition of the original McClintock narrative46 and The 
Antarctic Manual.47 Murray's rations48  presented in Table 1A 
are erroneous and do not reflect historical evidence. Murray, by 
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attributing his flawed data to Scott, is also incorrect.49 The 
number of man or dog(s) and the distance are not additive 
variables. 
 From the table, one can notice that Scott's dog sledge, 
Southern Journey was doomed from the start. In calculations 
of dog rations, Scott and Wilson50 used a half ration instead 
of the required 1 ration, because McClintock incorrectly 
suggested half.51,52 Consequently, the dogs were underfeed 
and soon after departure they 'seemed to lose all heart' and 
before long began to deteriorate. In order to advance his 
thesis, Murray, without evidence, attributes the sudden dete-
rioration of dogs to 'tainted food.' The dogs may not have 
liked to be fed with dried codfish but the supplies were not 
tainted with a mysterious 'species of scurvy'. While on half 
rations, hard working sledge dogs were simply starving and 
soon all of them perished. In Scott’s own words 'the real 
cruelty to a dog lies in over-working or underfeeding it’.53  
 One cannot restrict the notion of utilitarianism only to 
dogs, as in Murray's paper. The ponies of the Terra Nova 
expedition, in spite of Scott's previous pledge, miserably 
suffered to be shot, killed by Oates or Bowers with a pick-
axe, killed by killer whales, to fall in a crevasse, or turned to 
hoosh and eaten by the main polar party at the foot of the 
Beardmore Glacier.54 
 Finally, I wish to remark that the treatment of draught 
animals by explorers was not unique or characteristic for 
their expeditions and/or individual characters for  example 55, 56, 57 
The extraordinary physical and psychological burden of 
exploration was consequential to particular exploration spa-
tiotemporal goals and the respective adding up  for distance, 
time, speed, rations and endurance. 
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